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Did Technology Shocks Drive the Great
Depression? Explaining Cyclical 
Productivity Movements in U.S. 
Manufacturing, 1919–1939 
! 
ROBERT INKLAAR, HERMAN DE JONG, AND REITZE GOUMA 
 
Technology shocks and declining productivity have been advanced as important 
factors driving the Great Depression in the United States, based on real business 
cycle theory. We estimate an improved measure of technology for interwar 
manufacturing, using data from the U.S. census reports. There is clear evidence 
of increasing returns to scale and we find no statistical proof that technology 
shocks led to changes in hours worked or other inputs. This contradicts a key 
prediction of real business cycle theory. We find that increasing returns to scale 
are not due to market power but to labor and capital hoarding.  
 
hat drove the Great Depression of the 1930s? The discussion on 
the origins, depth, and duration of the Great Depression in the 
United States has lately been dominated by a new set of questions that 
are strongly related to real side factors. According to mainstream 
explanations, the Great Depression was a response to monetary 
contraction caused by bank failures and bad monetary policy. High  
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real interest rates depressed consumption and investment, arguably 
strengthened by the transmitting mechanism of the gold standard.1 In 
contrast, the real business cycle (RBC) view holds that technology (or 
productivity) shocks should be held responsible for the decline in output 
levels instead of demand shocks resulting from financial and monetary 
distress. Proponents of the RBC approach have pointed at the widely 
observed procyclical relationship between output levels and fluctuations 
in total factor productivity (TFP), measured as a detrended Solow 
residual in total GDP growth.2 One of the key contributions to this line 
of research for the American Depression economy is the work of Harold 
Cole and Lee Ohanian. Using an RBC model they put forward the idea 
that short-run fluctuations or shifts in the production function put 
downward pressure on the economy during the 1930s. According to this 
view technological regression (or some efficiency related factor) in the 
U.S. economy resulted in a contraction of inputs causing the Great 
Depression.3 
 The main contribution of our article is to show that the Solow TFP 
residual is an unfit measure on which to base such a conclusion, 
because it is a biased technology measure in the presence of market 
power or labor and capital hoarding.4 In an analysis of the postwar U.S. 
economy, Susanto Basu, John Fernald, and Miles Kimball estimate 
production functions to take market power and hoarding into account. 
Using the resulting “purified” technology measure, they find no positive 
correlation between technology shocks and input utilization.5 In this 
article, we are the first to apply their methodology to the interwar period 
and we find similar results, contradicting the predictions of RBC theory. 
Moreover, we establish that labor and capital hoarding rather than 
market power was the dominant reason for the decline in the Solow TFP 
residual after 1929. 
 The development of new, detailed manufacturing data is crucial  
to reaching these conclusions. Several studies on the procyclical 
behavior of productivity for the pre-1945 period rely on time series for 
the total economy or on output indices of selected branches within 
 
1 Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary; Temin, Monetary; and Eichengreen, Gold Standard. 
Lately, an alternative approach has been put forward by Sharon Harrison and Mark Weder, who 
suggest that shocks to expectations and self-fulfilling beliefs may have played an important role 
in causing the Great Depression: see Harrison and Weder, “Sunspot Forces.”  
2 Prescott, “Theory.” 
3 Cole and Ohanian, “Great Depression.” 
4 Basu and Fernald, “Aggregate,” p. 963. 
5 Basu, Fernald, and Kimball, “Technology.” Their result has been found using alternative 
methods as well and seems to represent a growing consensus, see e.g., Francis and Ramey, 
“Measures,” or Fève and Guay, “Identification.” 
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manufacturing.6 The present study builds on data taken from  
the Biennial Census of Manufactures, which covers total U.S. 
manufacturing for the period 1919–1939, classified into 19 industrial 
branches. Our analysis is greatly helped by this underutilized data 
source as the census provides a comprehensive account of 
manufacturing; a consistent set of output and input measures; and 
measures of gross output rather than the more commonly used value 
added. 
 We find that Solow residual TFP is an imperfect technology measure 
because it assumes constant returns to scale, while our estimates  
show that U.S. manufacturing industries are characterized by short-run 
increasing returns to scale. Following Basu, Fernald, and Kimball, we 
use the estimates of returns to scale to calculate a “purified” measure  
of technology change that takes into account that production is 
characterized by increasing returns to scale.7 We test the RBC 
hypothesis that inputs follow technology shocks procyclically and find 
that movements in technology have no significant effect on any input, 
which is consistent with the findings of Basu, Fernald, and Kimball for 
the U.S. postwar economy. This leads us to conclude that, in contrast  
to RBC theory, the Great Depression in the United States was not 
caused by negative technology shocks. This minimizes the scope  
for views that attribute the interwar productivity decrease to lower 
production efficiency.8  
 We also examine the source of the increasing returns to scale. In  
our empirical framework, we distinguish between market power and 
hoarding of labor and capital as two possible (nonexclusive) causes.  
We use a gross output framework to find evidence of both capital  
and labor hoarding, which is much harder to find in the value added 
framework used by others.9 Our production function estimates show 
that output responds more strongly to changes in intermediate inputs 
than what could be expected on the basis of the cost share of these 
inputs, while the output elasticities of labor and of capital are equal  
to their cost shares. This supports the hypothesis of labor and capital 
hoarding and contrasts with the market power hypothesis. The empirical 
 
6 Bernanke and Parkinson, “Procyclical”; Rosenbloom and Sundstrom, “Sources”; Cole and 
Ohanian, “New Deal” and “Second Look”; and Francis and Ramey, “Source.” Field looks at the 
private nonfarm economy (agriculture and government being the principal exclusions), roughly 
three-quarters of the economy: see Field, “Procyclical.” 
7 Basu, Fernald, and Kimball, “Technology,” p. 1418. 
8 Ohanian, “Productivity,” p. 37. 
9 E.g., Bernanke and Parkinson, “Procyclical.” 
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proof is consistent with recent historical research on the procyclicality of 
Solow residual TFP for the total U.S. economy.10 
 
PRODUCTIVITY SHOCKS AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 
 
 During the Great Contraction from 1929 to 1933, the U.S. economy 
exhibited an extremely poor record in output growth and factor 
utilization. Total nonfarm GDP declined by 34 percent and total hours 
worked by 31 percent. The decline in manufacturing was even more 
severe, with declines of 37 and 40 percent for output and working hours 
respectively.11 During this period, movements in productivity were 
procyclical. A detrended time series of Solow residual TFP for the U.S. 
economy reveals a decline of circa 18 percent between 1929 and 
1933. In a paper published in 1991, Ben Bernanke and Martin 
Parkinson have explained the procyclical relationship between 
movements in output and productivity by pointing at the effects of labor 
hoarding and “true” increasing returns.12 In contrast with this view and in 
support of RBC theory, Cole and Ohanian have interpreted the fall in 
Solow residual TFP not as a result of increasing returns but as a major 
exogenous technology shock. In a range of papers, they have tried to 
show how this shock led to decreasing marginal returns to capital and 
labor, and hence to a decline in employment and in the use of other 
inputs. According to this view, American workers substituted leisure for 
labor, due to a lower marginal product of labor, resulting in a decline of 
output.13 For the period after 1933, the authors did not find a clear 
procyclical pattern between productivity and output. Solow residual TFP 
levels in the U.S. economy recovered quickly, but the growth of inputs 
remained very weak. The authors suggest that from 1934 onwards, the 
U.S. economy seemed to settle on a lower growth path than its original—
pre-1929—steady state growth path. According to their analysis, supply-
side constraints related to the New Deal policies increased relative prices 
and real wages in cartelized sectors, changes that must have weakened 
the recovery and prolonged the high level of unemployment.14 Note, that 
from a growth accounting perspective, the RBC approach would attribute 
 
10 Field, “Procyclical.” 
11 Kendrick, Productivity, pp. 339, 466.  
12 Bernanke and Parkinson, “Procyclical,” p. 457. They see labor hoarding as an effect of G
the policy of firms to smooth labor input over the cycle. True increasing returns may result from 
a noncompetitive market structure. Because of the quality of the data they used, it was G
not possible to statistically discriminate between the two types of causes. See also Margo, 
“Employment,” p. 50. 
13 Cole and Ohanian, “Great Depression” and “Second Look,” p. 27. 
14 Ibid., pp. 46–47. 
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the contraction between 1929 and 1933 to a combination of a deteriorated 
production function and a withdrawal of inputs, not just the latter. Indeed, 
the former would cause the latter. 
 Is there strong empirical proof for the RBC—supply-side—
interpretation of the causes of the U.S. Depression? In a paper published 
in 2001, Ohanian applied a broad definition of a productivity shock  
to determine statistically what factors may possibly have affected 
measured productivity. He referred to changes in capacity utilization,  
in the quality of factor inputs, in the composition of production, and 
changes in labor hoarding and increasing returns in particular. But he 
found that all of these factors combined explain only about 5 percentage 
points of the 18 percent decrease in Solow residual TFP between  
1929 and 1933. He therefore concluded that his definition of a 
productivity shock would need revision.15 Recently, Ohanian has tried to 
find the source of negative Solow residual TFP shocks in ill-advised 
government programs or initiatives related to the labor market before 
1933. He emphasized that wage rate stabilization and work-sharing 
agreements resulting from President Hoover’s industrial labor program 
contributed to monetary non-neutrality.16 
 The RBC approach to the Depression has mainly been criticized  
for its method of analyzing short-run fluctuations with a general 
equilibrium model and its interpretation of causality running from 
technology shocks to a drop in output.17 Opponents of the RBC view 
maintain that business cycles were not exogenously caused by Solow 
residual TFP fluctuations but by aggregate demand fluctuations. Thus, 
shocks in Solow residual TFP are seen as the consequence instead of the 
cause of business cycles and of the Great Depression in particular.18 An 
alternative explanation of the procyclical relation between productivity 
and output is put forward by Alexander Field. In a recent paper in this 
JOURNAL, he has shown that Solow residual TFP in the United States was 
strongly procyclical between 1890 and 2004.19 But, in contrast to the 
RBC view, he suggests that procyclicality resulted principally from 
demand shocks, interacting with capital, which is relatively invariant over 
the cycle. This point of view proposes a different role for technology in 
 
15 Other efficiency related factors were seen as too small to have a large effect on aggregate 
productivity: Fiscal policies, trade, monetary shocks (including the sticky wage explanation), 
and financial intermediation shocks. Ohanian, “Productivity”; and Cole and Ohanian, “Second 
Look,” pp. 30–40. For a comment, see Parker, Economics, p. 115. 
16 Ohanian, “Great Depression,” p. 2332. 
17 Bernanke and Parkinson, “Procyclical,” pp. 448–49; Temin, “Real,” p. 673; and Field, 
“Procyclical,” p. 338.  
18 Temin, “Real,” pp. 671–73. 
19 Field, “Procyclical,” p. 328.  
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the story of the Depression. Field has pointed to a high level of 
innovative activity in the American economy that explains both the high 
peak-to-peak productivity growth and the high real wage levels of 
industrial workers between 1929 and 1941. In the first phase of the 
Depression of the 1930s, innovations were endogenously prevented from 
being taken up into the economy because of the fall in output and 
employment. But across the Depression years, there were many 
technological and organizational innovations, leading to rising returns to 
both labor and capital.20 These product and process innovations can be 
regarded as shocks to technology, but in this case they have the opposite 
effect of what RBC theorists propose.21 Clearly a formal framework is 
needed to establish empirically the precise relationship between 
technology and the business cycle in this period.  
 
A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ESTIMATION OF HISTORICAL 
PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS 
 
 The theoretical framework closely follows that of Basu, Fernald, and 
Kimball.22 In this model, returns to scale are given by the regression 
coefficient "  in the following equation 
 
dyit # bi $" dxit $ % it        (1) 
 
The dependent variable in this model, dy , is the growth of industry output 
in industry i at time t. In this equation and those that follow, d  followed 
by a lowercase letter is used to indicate the growth rate (change in log 
value) of that variable. The explanatory variable is the weighted average 
growth of inputs, dx . When estimating equation 1, one concern can  
be that the average rate of technological change differs systematically 
across industries. We therefore include industry dummies (denoted bi) in 
every regression. Finally, % it  is the residual of the regression. Technology 
change, dz , is defined as dzit # dyit &" dxit # bi $ %it . Growth of inputs is 
defined as a cost-share weighted average of the growth of individual 
inputs 
 
20 Field, “Most,” pp. 1410–11. Field also mentions that in the 1930s R&D investments were 
higher than in the 1920s; see “Technological,” pp. 214–16. 
21 Endogenous explanations for the fast Solow residual TFP growth after 1933 include 
“beneficial shakeouts” affecting the distribution of technology and productivity levels within 
industries as a result of the process of exit and entry of firms. Bresnahan and Raff, “Intra-
Industry,” p. 331; Hart and Malley, “Procyclical,” p. 534; Parker, Economics, p. 221; and 
Margo, “Employment,” p. 50. 
22 See the online appendix for a brief but more formal exposition. 




 dxit # cit
LW dlwit $ cit
LSdlsit $ cit
HPdhpit $ cit
M dmit                (2) 
 
We distinguish four inputs, namely total hours paid to wage laborers 
(LW), total hours paid to salaried workers (LS), total horsepower installed 
(HP), and intermediate inputs (M). Cost shares are denoted by c  and the 
upper bar indicates a two-period average. As discussed in more detail in 
the next section, our data consists of a panel of biennial observations on 
output and inputs in 19 branches of manufacturing industries from 1919 
to 1939, so i  runs from 1 to 19 and t  from 1 to 10. 
 A concern in estimating equation 1 is simultaneity bias: faced with a 
technology shock, an optimizing firm will in general not only change  
the amount of output produced but also the amount of inputs used, 
leading to contemporaneous correlation.23 The standard solution in the 
literature is to estimate the production functions with instrumental 
variables for the inputs that reflect aspects of industry demand but are not 
correlated with industry productivity shocks.24 This requires that changes 
in the instrument are not causing or are not being caused by industry 
productivity shocks. The change in the oil price is frequently used in the 
postwar period and we use it here for the interwar period as well.  
In addition, we use the instruments of Bernanke and Parkinson, namely 
government expenditure (current and lagged), the currency-deposit ratio 
and real deposits at failed banks. As for the validity of these instruments, 
it seems implausible that a productivity shock in any one industry will 
lead to bank failures or large-scale withdrawals of deposits by the  
public. Likewise, each industry is likely to be too small to influence total 
government expenditure or the oil price. In return, each of these variables 
may have some effect on technology, but it is unlikely that this effect 
occurs in the short run. In our analysis, we find that the estimates using 
instrumental variables are robust to using any subset of these variables. 
So even if one might object to one or more instruments, the results can be 
relied upon as long as not all instruments are objectionable.  
 Our approach differs from that of Bernanke and Parkinson insofar that 
they estimated the output elasticity of labor in a value added framework 
and concluded that there was evidence of short-run increasing returns  
to labor in the interwar period. However, as Basu and Fernald argued, 
estimating value added production functions may well lead to biased 
results since the implicit assumption is made that the output elasticities of 
 
23 Griliches and Mairesse, “Production.” 
24 Hall, “Invariance”; and Bernanke and Parkinson, “Procyclical,” p. 452. 
834 Inklaar, De Jong, and Gouma  
  
  
intermediate inputs are equal to their cost shares.25 We therefore estimate 
gross output production functions and focus on the broader returns to 
scale concept rather than short-run increasing returns to labor. 
 
Testing Real Business Cycle Theory 
 
 As discussed above, the key prediction from RBC theory is that 
technology changes lead to changes in inputs. Note that the standard 
RBC model does not distinguish between individual industries but only 
makes aggregate predictions. Hence, Basu, Fernald, and Kimball focus 
their tests on a technology series for the nonfarm private economy, 
calculated from industry technology residuals based on equation 1.  
In our analysis, this is not a feasible approach since our data cover 
manufacturing industries rather than the non-farm private economy. 
Instead, we use industry technology change directly, comparing the 
response of output and inputs to Solow residual TFP changes and 
technology changes. 
 Formally, we estimate the effect that changes in Solow residual TFP 
or technology have on inputs 
 
   dxit #' i
A $ ( Adait $)it
A                                    (3) 
   dxit #' i
Z $ ( Zdzit $)it
Z
                                   (4) 
 
where dait  is the change in Solow residual TFP, dzit  is technology 
change, ( A  is the effect of Solow residual TFP changes on inputs, ( Z  
is the effect of technology change on inputs, and )it  is the residual in 
the two regressions. The change in Solow residual TFP is defined as 
dait # dyit & dxit , which is the growth of output minus the growth of 
inputs. This assumes constant returns to scale. Technology change is 
defined as dzit # dyit &" dxit , so the growth of output minus returns to 
scale times the growth of input. These two measures will be different if 
we find evidence of nonconstant returns to scale. 
 In equation 3, we test the effect of a change in Solow residual TFP 
growth on inputs (or total hours worked), while in equation 4 we test the 
effect of technology change on inputs. RBC theory would be confirmed 
if we find that both ( A  and ( Z  are significantly positive, since this 
would imply that both Solow residual TFP and our technology measure 
 
25 Basu and Fernald, “Returns.” In the robustness analysis in the online appendix, we show 
that this bias is indeed considerable and estimating a value added function would lead to the 
wrong conclusions regarding the source of increasing returns. 
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have the positive impact on inputs that is predicted by RBC theory.  
If, on the other hand, only ( A  is significantly positive, it would be an 
indication that Solow residual TFP change is a poor measure of 
technology change, because it wrongly assumes constant returns to 
scale. This would cast doubt on the hypothesis that technology shocks 
drive the business cycle and contributed to the depth of the Great 
Depression.26 
 
Increasing Returns: Market Power versus Hoarding 
 
 In addition to testing whether the RBC predictions are confirmed  
in the data, we can go a step further and consider the sources of  
any increasing returns we find. This should allow us to identify why 
Solow residual TFP change is mismeasured, rather than only concluding 
that increasing returns lead it to be mismeasured. We consider two 
hypotheses that are frequently mentioned in the literature, namely 
market power and labor and capital hoarding. While these explanations 
are not mutually exclusive, we argue that both hypotheses have 
different implications for the coefficients estimated from the following 
regression 
 




M dmit $ % it             (5) 
 
Instead of the weighted average input growth from equation 1, we  
now include all four inputs separately, alongside the industry fixed 
effects bi  and residuals% it . Coefficient * x  is the output elasticity of 
input x . In the basic neoclassical production model with constant 
returns to scale, these output elasticities will be equal to the cost shares 
of each input, cx , and sum to one.27 In general, the sum of output 
elasticities reflects the returns to scale: * x
x
+ #" . When "  is greater 
than one, there are increasing returns to scale, " equal to one constant 
returns, and "  less than one decreasing returns. 
 If the sum of output elasticities is greater than one, this can be due to 
market power of firms. But estimating individual output elasticities 
allows us to test whether this is indeed the case. As we argue in  
 
26 We also looked at the effect of adding lagged values of Solow residual TFP and technology 
change to equations 3 and 4. The contemporaneous effect tested in equations 3 and 4 is never 
statistically different from zero and the lagged results were in line with those of Basu, Fernald, 
and Kimball, “Technology,” see the online Appendix. 
27 Solow, “Technical.” 
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more detail in the online appendix, the market power hypothesis implies 
that all output elasticities are greater than their cost shares by the same 
factor " . In other words, we would find that * x # " cx  for all inputs x . 
Intuitively, market power induces a firm to restrict its output below the 
competitive level, but this does not affect the input mix the firm chooses, 
reducing all inputs proportionally. 
 The other hypothesis is labor and capital hoarding. Firms may hoard 
labor and capital because changing the size of the workforce or the 
capital stock will typically involve adjustment costs: fixed costs 
associated with hiring and firing, for instance, or retooling of the 
production line. Therefore, a firm will not immediately change these 
inputs after a change in demand, but instead it will vary the degree to 
which it utilizes them. So, after a drop in demand, like in the early 1930s, 
firms tend to hoard labor and capital temporarily.28 As Basu, Fernald, and 
Kimball argue, hoarding will show up in the output elasticity of the 
flexible inputs.29 If a firm decides to increase its unmeasured inputs, such 
as the workweek of capital or the effort of workers, it will also increase 
measured inputs. If the firm wants to work its machines for more hours, 
the machines require more energy and material inputs.30 This implies that 
the effect on output of changes in the flexible inputs will also in part 
reflect changes in the unmeasured inputs. Basu, Fernald, and Kimball use 
changes in average hours worked as their “flexible input,” but in our data 
we do not know the number of hours worked, only the number of hours 
paid. Instead, we focus on intermediate inputs as the flexible input, 
following other studies in this literature.31 
 The two hypotheses, hoarding and market power, are not mutually 
exclusive. So if we find evidence of increasing returns to scale based on 
equation 1, we might find one of the following four patterns when 
estimating equation 5. The first pattern states that none of the estimated 
output elasticities differs significantly from its cost share, so *ˆ x # cx , 
where a hat over a variable denotes an econometric estimate. The 
 
28 Ohanian is skeptical of the advancement of labor hoarding as an explanation for low 
productivity, because firms were aware of the persistence of the Depression. See Ohanian, 
“Productivity,” p. 37. Field stresses that the involuntary hoarding of capital is the most important 
factor in explaining the procyclicality of Solow residual TFP in the United States. See Field, 
“Procyclical,” p. 334. Firms may treat overhead and skilled labor like a fixed factor because of 
contractual commitments and the high costs of rehiring and retraining workers or reassign skilled 
labor to factory jobs. See Kuh, “Cyclical,” p. 8; Margo, “Employment,” p. 44; and Bresnahan and 
Raff, “Intra-Industry,” p. 327. 
29 Basu, Fernald, and Kimball, “Technology.” 
30 More formally, a firm will adjust all its flexible inputs following a change in demand in 
order to equate the marginal costs of all inputs. 
31 Basu, “Procyclical”; and Hart and Malley, “Procyclical,” pp. 541–42. See also the online 
appendix for more details of the theoretical model. 
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elasticity estimates are then too noisy to allow us any conclusions 
regarding hoarding or market power. A second pattern would reveal that 
the intermediate input elasticity is larger than its cost share, so *ˆM , cM  
while the other input elasticities do not differ significantly from their cost 
share. This would be consistent with the hoarding hypothesis, but not 
with the market power hypothesis. Third, we might find that the 
intermediate input elasticity is larger than its cost share, but one or more 
of the other input elasticities is larger as well. This is consistent with the 
market power hypothesis, but the hoarding hypothesis also cannot be 
rejected. A fourth finding would be one where the intermediate input 
elasticity does not differ significantly from its cost share, but one or more 
of the other input elasticities are significantly larger than their cost shares. 
This is consistent with the market power hypothesis, but not with the 
hoarding hypothesis, since intermediate inputs are assumed to be flexible 
enough to be adjusted without facing costs. 
 It is important to note that this approach to distinguishing between 
market power, or “true increasing returns” and hoarding differs from that 
of Bernanke and Parkinson. They argue that including demand indicators 
such as the instruments discussed below in the estimation of equation 1 
will allow for a distinction between the hypotheses. They hold that if they 
find increasing returns without such demand indicators but constant 
returns if those indicators are included, this is evidence of hoarding.32 
However, this argument crucially depends on the ability of these demand 
indicators to proxy for hoarding. To put it differently, if there are still 
significantly increasing returns to scale when the demand indicators are 
included in the regression, this could be because market power is driving 
these increasing returns or because the demand indicators are poor. The 
advantage of our identification strategy is that there are two possible 
patterns of output elasticities for which we can confidently rule out one of 
the hypotheses. 
 
REWORKING THE DATA ON INPUTS AND OUTPUT FOR U.S. 
MANUFACTURING 
 
 This article presents a new data set to analyze the developments in 
output, inputs and productivity in the interwar period. We will explain 
here the sources that we have used. More details, however, are given in 
Appendix 1. The main data source for this article is the Biennial Census 
of Manufactures of the United States Department of Commerce held 
 
32 Bernanke and Parkinson, “Procyclical,” pp. 440–42. 
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between 1919 and 1939.33 We use data on gross output, value added, the 
cost of materials, installed horsepower of machinery, the number of wage 
earners and total wages paid, and the number of salary earners and total 
salaries paid for all industries reported in the census. Because all the 
information in the census was gathered through the processing of 
questionnaires at the firm level, there is internal consistency between 
input and output data. We classified the industry data in 19 manufacturing 
branches (see Appendix 1, Appendix Table 1), which sum up to total 
manufacturing. 
 To calculate the number of annual hours worked in an industry and to 
measure labor input on an hourly basis, the total wage sum from  
the census data was divided by an hourly wage rate calculated from  
the Monthly Labor Review, from W. Woytinski and Associates, and  
from Wages in the United States, published by the National Industrial 
Conference Board.34 Wage rates are available on a monthly basis for some 
100 selected industries, which we matched with the industries in the 
census. The representativeness of these data for total manufacturing is 
high. The number of wage earners in the selected industries in the Monthly 
Labor Review covers about 75 percent of the total manufacturing sector. 
Next, the industry hourly wages were aggregated to the same 19 industries 
and weighted with the number of wage earners, to arrive at an average 
hourly wage rate for each industry. 
 In addition to data on horsepower of installed machinery, we also 
estimated data on capital stocks in manufacturing. We used capital-output 
ratios from Daniel Creamer, Sergei Dobrovolsky, and Israel Borenstein 
and the annual investment series by J. Frederic Dewhurst et al.35 We 
interpolated linearly between the three benchmark capital stock estimates 
(1919, 1929, and 1937) and estimated capital stocks for 1939 by applying 
the average growth over the entire period. In the online appendix, we 
show that estimations based on this alternative capital measure give 
results very similar to the results we report in the next section.  
 Gross outputs of the industries in the census have been converted into 
constant prices using the price indexes of John Kendrick.36 While he 
applied these prices directly to value added, they are actually (gross) 
output prices, so we use them accordingly. In addition, we construct 
intermediate input prices based on industry output prices and input-output 
weights, a method in line with current statistical practice 
 
 
33 U.S. Department of Commerce, Biennial Census of Manufactures. 
34 U.S. Department of Labor,GMonthly Labor Review; and Woytinsky and Associates, Employment; 
Wages. 
35 Creamer,GDobrovolsky, and Borenstein, Capital; and Dewhurst et al., America’s. 
36 Kendrick, Productivity. 
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 Equation 6 states that the intermediate input price change of  
industry i  is calculated as the weighted average output price change over 
all N  industries, including manufacturing and nonmanufacturing 
industries. Ideally, the weights w  would change over time, but we only 
have the 1939 input-output table of Wassily Leontief (1953), so we use 
the same weights in every period.37 The output and intermediate input 
price changes are used to deflate the nominal series from the census. 
 For the sensitivity analysis reported in the online appendix, we  
also consider alternative measures of output and intermediate inputs. 
Following Bernanke and Parkinson, we consider value added instead of 
gross output. Value added at constant prices can be computed using gross 
output prices, resulting in single-deflated value added, or double-deflated 
value added prices. Double-deflated value added prices are based on the 
intermediate input prices computed according to equation 6 and industry 





M $ 1& vit- .dpitV                                  (7) 
 
where vit  is the share of intermediate inputs in gross output, and a bar 
over the variable denotes a two-period average share. The calculation 
method in equation 7 is a Törnqvist index, but other index number 
formulas can also be used, such as a Fisher or a chained Laspeyres 
index.38 
 From equation 7, it is easy to see that single-deflated value added, 
using the output price change for the price change of value added, 
implicitly assumes that intermediate input price changes are also equal to 
output price changes: dpV # dpY # dpM . In the robustness analysis 
reported in the online appendix, we show that our estimates of returns to 
scale are not sensitive to using output-price deflated intermediate inputs 
instead of input-price deflated intermediate inputs. Likewise, estimates of 
returns to scale based on double-deflated and single-deflated value added 
are consistent with gross-output based returns to scale. However, the 
 
37 Leontief, Structure of the American Economy. 
38 The Törnqvist index is appealing because it is an exact index for a wide range of possible 
production functions. The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis uses the Fisher index while the 
chained Laspeyres index is used by European agencies. In practice, the differences between 
these index number formulas are generally small. 
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source of these increasing returns cannot be correctly identified in a value 
added context, because the flexible intermediate inputs are “netted out.” 
 For most of our instruments, we followed Bernanke and Parkinson  
for both the selection and data source.39 Hence, data on government 
expenditure is taken from John M. Firestone; the currency-deposit ratio  
is from Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz and the variable  
“deposits of failed banks” is from the Federal Reserve Bulletin.40 To 
deflate government expenditure and deposits of failed banks, we applied 
the consumer price index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In addition, 
we have taken the oil price from the NBER Macrohistory Database,41 
measured as the “U.S. Wholesale Price of Crude Petroleum, At Wells.”42 
All instruments were included as log differences in the regressions. 
 
RESULTS FROM THE ESTIMATED PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS 
 
 We first estimate returns to scale in equation 1, where we explain  
the biennial change in output by the biennial weighted average  
input change as an explanatory variable. Weighted average input growth, 
in turn, is defined in equation 2 and is based on the growth  
of salaried worker hours, wage worker hours, horsepower installed,  
and intermediate inputs, each weighted by its cost share. To account  
for industry-specific technology trends, we include industry-specific 
constant terms (fixed effects). Although we have alternative measures for 
each of our output and input measures, we present results using our 
preferred measures in this section. The online appendix shows that the 
results using alternative measures are very similar. 
 We use gross output as the output measure since it is the  
most comprehensive. As labor inputs, we use total hours paid by  
salary workers and by wage workers for the same reason.43 We use 
horsepower installed since this is available from the Biennial Census and 
therefore consistent with the other input and output data; and  
we use input-price deflated intermediate inputs since this measure is  
the conceptually more appealing than output-price deflated intermediate 
inputs. 
 
39 Bernanke and Parkinson, “Procyclical.” 
40 Deposits of failed banks are unavailable before 1921, but the number of failed banks G
is available. Moreover, before 1929 the average size of failed banks is fairly stable, so we use this 
average size to estimate deposits of failed banks for 1919. See Bernanke and Parkinson, 
“Procyclical”; Firestone, “Federal”; and Friedman and Schwartz, “Monetary.” 
41 Suggested by Hall, “Relation.” 
42 See http://www.nber.org/databases/macrohistory/contents/. Accessed in June 2010. 
43 Bernanke and Parkinson measured value added represented by direct measures of physical 
output and labor input by total hours of work of production workers only: see Bernanke and 
Parkinson, “Procyclical,” pp. 445, 458. 




RETURNS TO SCALE IN U.S. MANUFACTURING, 1919–1939 
      (1) 
 
     OLS 
      (2) 
 
       IV 






p-value Hausman test (OLS is consistent) 0.883 
Overidentification test (p-value) 0.006 







* p < 0.1. 
** p < 0.05. 
*** p < 0.01. 
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by industry, are in parentheses. The null hypothesis is 
that the parameter is equal to 1. The dependent variable is biennial growth of gross output in 
each of 19 manufacturing industries between 1919 and 1939. Weighted average input growth is 
calculated using total hours worked, horsepower installed, and input-deflated intermediate 
inputs, with two-period average cost shares used as weights. All regressions include industry 
fixed effects (not shown, see the online Appendix Table 4). The results in column 2 are 
estimated using two-stage least squares with the change in the oil price, real government 
expenditure, lagged real government expenditure, the currency-deposit ratio, and real deposits 
of failed banks as instruments. Since the IV-regression is not a linear projection of the 
independent variables on the dependent variable, no R-squared can be calculated. See the main 
text for discussion of the overidentification and weak instrument tests. 
Sources: See the text. 
 
 Table 1 shows the results from estimating equation 1, using ordinary 
least squares (OLS) in column 1 and using two-stage least squares 
based on instrumental variables (IV) in column 2.44 Column 1 shows 
significant increasing returns to scale of 1.181, implying that a one 
percent change in inputs is accompanied by a 1.181 percent change in 
output. Note that the asterisks denote the statistical significance of  
the coefficients compared to the null hypothesis of constant returns to 
scale, i.e., a coefficient of one. Industry fixed effects are included  
but not shown in Table 1. Instead, the online appendix shows the fixed 
effects, which measure the period average technology change of each 
industry, alongside average Solow residual TFP growth, which assumes 
returns to scale are constant.45 
 Column 2 of Table 1 presents the results where we have used the 
change in oil price, real government expenditure, lagged real government 
expenditure, the currency-deposit ratio, and real deposits of failed banks 
 
44 As noted before, we include industry fixed effects in all specifications. If we include year 
effects, this does not change the results. However, these are omitted since our instruments are 
not industry-specific and thus would be perfectly collinear with the year effects. 
45 Recall that Solow residual TFP growth is dy & dx , technology change is dy &" dx . 
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as instruments that reflect industry demand but are not correlated with 
possible technology shocks. The estimates of returns to scale are very 
similar to the OLS estimates in column 1. A Hausman test can be used to 
determine whether there is a statistically significant difference between 
the ordinary least squares (OLS) and the instrumental variable (IV) 
regressions and this test shows no statistically significant difference  
(p = 0.883). So, the Hausman test confirms OLS as the best efficient 
estimator of the model.46 
 For establishing the robustness of our returns to scale estimates,  
we considered alternative data choices, such as different input and 
output measures. We also tested whether there is heterogeneity in 
returns to scale across different groups of industries, such as between 
capital-intensive or durable-goods producing industries and noncapital 
intensive or nondurable industries. The results, shown in the online 
appendix, display little or no sensitivity to alternative input and output 
measures and no statistically significant differences across industry 
groups. 
 
Testing the Real Business Cycle Hypothesis 
 
 The key test of the RBC model and of a possible technology  
shock setting off the Great Depression is whether exogenous technology 
changes have had a positive and significant relationship with overall 
inputs and total hours worked. Table 2 reports the main results of this 
test. In the first column, labeled “Technology,” the technology residuals 
from the IV regression from column 2 of Table 1 have been used as  
the explanatory variable. This is the residual defined in equation 1 and 
any increasing returns to scale, due to labor hoarding, for example, are 
excluded from this technology measure. The measure in the second 
column, labeled “Solow residual TFP,” assumes constant returns to scale, 
so includes both technology change and increasing returns to scale. We 
have used the IV residuals rather than the OLS residuals since the OLS 
residuals are by construction (contemporaneously) uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables.47 Each row in the table indicates a different 
dependent variable, so each element in the table represents a separate 
regression. 
 
46 The rejection of the overidentification test implies our instruments are not valid. G
We reestimated the IV regression based on all combinations of the five instruments. The 
overidentification test is not rejected in many cases, none of the instruments consistently leads 
to rejection, and the results are similar regardless of the outcome of the test. The high value of 
the weak instrument test confirms the relevance of our instruments; see Stock and Yogo, 
“Testing,” and the online appendix for the first-stage regression results. 
47 This follows from the definition of the OLS estimator. 




THE EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGY CHANGE AND SOLOW RESIDUAL TFP CHANGE ON 
INPUTS IN U.S. MANUFACTURING, 1919!1939 
 Explanatory Variable: 
 Technology Solow Residual TFP 
Dependent variable:   
   
Total inputs 0.0264       0.544** 
 (0.210) (0.249) 
Total hours 0.0878        0.568** 
 (0.276) (0.268) 
* p < 0.1. 
** p < 0.05. 
*** p < 0.01. 
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by industry, are in parentheses. Each cell in the table 
represents a separate regression with one dependent variable and one explanatory variable. 
Dependent variables are either total inputs (weighted average growth of inputs) or growth of 
total hours. Explanatory variables are either technology change, the residual from the IV 
regression in column 2 of Table 1; or Solow residual TFP change, which is the growth of output 
minus weighted average growth of inputs. 
Sources: See the text. 
  
 The rows labeled “Total inputs” and “Total hours” of Table 2 cast 
serious doubt on the RBC hypothesis for the interwar period. Changes 
in Solow residual TFP are associated with large and statistically 
significant procyclical changes in inputs while a change in technology 
has no statistically significant effect on inputs. RBC theory predicts a 
positive relationship between each measure of technological change  
and inputs, so the absence of a statistically significant effect contradicts 
RBC theory. Compared to the findings of Basu, Fernald, and Kimball, 
we do not find a significantly negative relationship between technology 
and inputs, but this may well be due to the biennial nature of our  
data. Basu, Fernald, and Kimball find a significant negative effect in 
year one and a significant positive effect of similar magnitude in year 
two. Summed over the first two years of their regressions, the effect of 
technology change on inputs is therefore about zero, as in our results.48 
We also verified whether these results are robust to adding lagged 
technology change and Solow residual TFP growth as Basu et al. did 
and those results were consistent with the findings from Table 2.49 
 Much of the analysis of Cole and Ohanian focuses specifically on the 
depth of the Depression, 1929–1933. To rule out that statistical patterns  
 
 
48 Basu, Fernald, and Kimball, “Technology.” 
49 See the online appendix. 




RETURNS TO SCALE AND THE EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGY CHANGE BY PERIOD IN 
U.S. MANUFACTURING, 1919!1939 
                                                                      Pre-Contraction   Contraction  
                                                                         1919!1927        1929!1933 
Post-Contraction 
    1935!1939 
A: Returns to scale estimation 












    












 (0.281) (0.194) (0.349) 
Total hours 0.696** 0.227 !0.720* 
 (0.278) (0.260) (0.350) 
* p < 0.1. 
** p < 0.05.  
*** p < 0.01.  
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by industry, are in parentheses. In Panel A, the 
dependent variable is output growth; the explanatory variable is weighted average input growth. 
“Returns to scale” is the coefficient of weighted average input growth and asterisks denote 
whether this coefficient is significantly different from 1. Returns to scale are estimated using 
two-stage least squares with the change in the oil price, real government expenditure, lagged 
real government expenditure, the currency-deposit ratio, and real deposits of failed banks as 
instruments (compare column 2 of Table 1). In Panel B, the residuals from Panel A are used to 
explain (growth of) total inputs and total hours (compare Table 2). All regressions include 
industry fixed effects (not shown). 
Sources: See the text. 
 
for the full 1919–1939 period in Tables 1 and 2 are misleading for  
the Great Contraction years, we split our sample into pre-Contraction  
(1919–1927), Contraction (1929–1933), and post-Contraction (1935–1939) 
years. The estimated returns to scale and the effects of technology shocks 
on inputs are shown in Table 3.50 The results reveal a clear difference 
between the pre-Contraction period, where the point estimates suggest 
decreasing returns to scale, the Contraction period with a statistically 
insignificant estimate of increasing returns to scale, and the post-
Contraction period with strongly increasing returns.51 As a result, the 
effect of technology shocks in the 1920s seems more in line with RBC 
theory, with significantly positive effects on inputs. However, the results 
for the periods 1929–1933 and 1935–1939 are inconsistent with the RBC 
view. Indeed, the results for the 1929–1933 period are most closely in line 
with those for the full period from Table 2.  
 
50 Taking the 1929–1939 period as the Contraction period does not affect these results. 
51 Note that estimating returns to scale for the 1929–1933 period using OLS rather, than the 
IV estimates shown in Table 3, does show significantly increasing returns. The combination of a 
short time period and the added imprecision of IV relative to OLS estimates therefore lead to the 
insignificant estimate. 
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 The main conclusion from the first part of the analysis is therefore  
that negative technology shocks in U.S. manufacturing played little role  
in causing the Great Depression. The measured short-run standard Solow 
residual does not reflect changes in technology in the Depression era, 
which is inconsistent with a key prediction of RBC theorists. However, 
this provides no clear-cut evidence for what is driving these increasing 
returns. It could be that utilization effects are important since those would 
be most relevant during the 1930s. This would support the argument of 
Field that labor productivity and Solow residual TFP are both procyclical 
because of involuntary hoarding of capital. Businesses, and especially 
capital-intensive industries, were unable to get rid of capital in a 
downturn.52 However, it could also signal that surviving firms enjoyed 
greater market power following New Deal measures that dampened 
competition. This brings us to the other main question, namely what is 
driving the increasing returns: market power and/or hoarding? 
 
Increasing Returns: Market Power or Hoarding? 
 
 The output elasticities of individual inputs contain valuable 
information that can help us determine whether the increasing returns 
that we found were caused by market power or by labor and  
capital hoarding. Table 4 provides the results from estimating  
equation 5. Column 1 replicates the estimate from column 1 of Table 1, 
showing significant increasing returns to scale. Columns 2 and 3  
replace weighted average input growth by the growth of the four  
inputs separately. In column 2, the coefficients of the input-deflated 
intermediate inputs (our preferred indicator) are displayed, while in 
column 3 output-deflated intermediate inputs are shown. Column 4 lists 
the cost shares of each input, averaged across branches and years. The 
bottom row shows returns to scale. For column 1, this is simply the 
coefficient on weighted average input growth. For columns 2 and 3, it is 
the sum of the output elasticities. 
 The returns to scale estimates are similar across the three 
specifications, implying increasing returns of about 20 percent. But new 
are the output elasticities and how they compare to the respective cost 
shares. For all these estimates we tested whether the output elasticity !
is equal to the actual cost share shown in column 4. For example, !
while the estimate of 0.181 in column 3 for the coefficient of growth !
of hours worked by wage earners is significantly larger than zero,!
 
 
52 Field, “Procyclical.” 




RETURNS TO SCALE, OUTPUT ELASTICITIES, AND INPUT COST SHARES IN U.S. 
MANUFACTURING, 1919!1939 





















   
























Returns to scale 1.181** 1.246* 1.173** 1.000 
* p < 0.1. 
** p < 0.05.  
*** p < 0.01. 
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by industry, are in parentheses. The null hypothesis !
for weighted average input growth and returns to scale is that the parameter is equal to 1. !
In columns 2 and 3, returns to scale is the sum of the input coefficients. For other variables, the 
null hypothesis is that the parameter is equal to its cost share in column 4. Dependent variable !
in columns 1!3 is biennial growth of gross output in each of the 19 manufacturing industries 
between 1919 and 1939. Independent variable in column 1 is weighted average input !
growth based on total hours worked, horsepower installed, and input-deflated intermediate !
inputs. Column 2 includes input-price deflated growth of intermediate inputs and column 3 
includes output-price deflated intermediate inputs. All regressions include industry fixed effects !
(not shown). Column 4 shows the average cost shares across industries and years of each input 
in total output. By assumption, the cost shares sum to one. 
Sources: See the text. 
 
it is not statistically significantly different from the actual cost share of 
wage earners, which is 0.169. Indeed, for none of the capital 
(horsepower installed) and labor (wage earners and salary earners) 
coefficients can we reject equality of output elasticity and cost share. 
However, the output elasticity of intermediate inputs (0.792 and 0.735) 
is statistically significantly larger than the cost share of 0.552. Should 
we focus only on the point estimates, it would imply that the output 
elasticity of intermediate inputs can account for all increasing returns. 
In terms of the patterns/hypotheses mentioned in Section 3,  
it means that we can reject the market power hypothesis, since that 
hypothesis predicts that all output elasticities would be larger than  
their cost share by the same factor. The results confirm the hoarding 
hypothesis since the coefficient of the intermediate inputs shows an 
output elasticity statistically significantly larger than its cost share, 
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while the other input elasticities do not differ significantly from their 
cost share.53 These results illustrate the importance of using a gross 
output framework. In a value added framework, intermediate inputs are 
assumed to have an impact on output that is in line with their cost 
shares. We show in Table 4 that this is not the case. Indeed, estimating 
production functions in a value added framework would lead to biased 
and misleading results.54 
 In the literature, many examples can be found of actual labor 
hoarding during the early 1930s. Bernanke explained the drop of the 
American workweek and the introduction of work-sharing as an 
efficient way for firms to react to falling demand. Firms cut production 
but at the same time the work force was left intact by spread-work 
schedules.55 Robert Margo has argued that the legislation connected to 
the National Industry Recovery Act (1933–1935) promoted work-
sharing provisions leading to the reduction in the length of the 
workweek.56 A theoretical explanation is that especially skilled work 
might be viewed as a fixed factor in the short run. A certain part of the 
labor force acts as a buffer stock. Some labor that is normally used in 
production can be diverted into maintenance and repair operations 
during a recession.57 Recently, Field has mentioned the important role 
of capital hoarding in explaining the procyclicality of Solow residual 
TFP. Holding existing capital is unavoidable and capital must be held 
by someone. Field’s argument regarding capital hoarding implies that 
Solow residual TFP really did go down between 1929 and 1933 and it 
was not just a matter of mismeasurement. Capital service flows, in 
particular, were amortized over a much-reduced flow of output, so 
output per unit of input really did fall according to this interpretation.58 
 To see how large the impact of hoarding has been in manufacturing, 
we can illustrate the different time pattern of technology and hoarding 
in Figure 1. 
 
 
53 We can also estimate the regression in columns 2 and 3 using instrumental variables (IV), 
as in Table 1. In that case, we find no evidence that output elasticities are different from cost 
shares. However, Hausman tests indicate that the OLS estimates in Table 4 are consistent. This 
is sufficient ground to prefer the estimates shown in columns 2 and 3, since OLS is more 
efficient. IV coefficient standard errors are between 2.5 and 50 times higher than OLS 
coefficient standard errors in this case. 
54 See the online appendix, Appendix Table 7 for this result: in a value added framework, the 
output elasticities associated with labor are larger than their cost share, as the intermediate input 
elasticity is forced to be equal to the cost share. 
55 Bernanke, “Employment,” p. 89; and Jacoby, Employing, pp. 212–14. 
56 Margo, “Employment,” p. 45. 
57 Kuh, “Cyclical,” p. 8. 
58 Field, “Procyclical,” p. 334. 






SOLOW RESIDUAL TFP VERSUS TECHNOLOGY INDEX, WEIGHTED AVERAGE FOR 
TOTAL U.S. MANUFACTURING, 1919!1939  
(1919 = 1) 
 
Notes: The series “Solow residual TFP” is an index with 1919 = 1 and growth rates based on 
industry Solow residual TFP change. Industry Solow residual TFP change is calculated as the 
growth of industry gross output minus the cost-share-weighted growth of inputs: intermediate 
inputs (input-price deflated), growth of hours worked by wage and salary earners, and growth  
of horsepower installed. Industry Solow residual TFP changes are weighted using industry  
value added shares. The series “Technology” is an index with 1919 = 1 and growth rates based 
on industry technology change. Industry technology change is calculated as the growth of 
industry gross output minus returns to scale times cost-share-weighted growth of inputs. Returns 
to scale are estimated as equal to 1.181 in Table 1. Industry technology change is weighted 
using industry value added shares. 
Sources: See the text. 
 
 The Solow residual estimate of TFP growth for each industry is 
calculated as the growth of output minus the weighted growth of 
intermediate inputs, labor, and capital assuming constant returns to 
scale. Technological change is calculated as the growth of output minus 
1.181 times inputs, where 1.181 is the returns to scale factor estimated 
in Table 1. We used value added shares to get a weighted average 
growth for overall manufacturing and turned this into an index with 
1919 = 1. 
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Both series show the same overall pattern. Over the total period, the 
estimates suggest a rise in TFP of 28 to 31 percent between 1919 and 
1939. But there are large differences in the variation of the series in 
individual periods, notably in 1920/21, the Great Contraction 
between 1929 and 1933, and the 1937 contraction. In the 1920/21 
slump, Solow residual TFP grew at a slower rate than technology, while 
in the last two periods Solow residual TFP showed larger drops than 
technology. Our analysis has shown that this difference can be 
explained by hoarding effects. Between 1933 and 1937, however, 
Solow residual TFP is growing much faster than technology, 
because of massive expansion in the utilization of capital and labor. 
 Focusing on the period 1929–1933, technology dropped by only 1.5 
percent, compared with an 8.9 percent fall in Solow residual TFP.  
Each decline is too small to explain the deep fall of output in the 
Depression, but each still shows declines. In part, this may reflect  
that “true” returns to scale will vary by industry and period, compared 
to our common scale factor, but it may also reflect firm dynamics.  
While we label our series “technology,” in line with e.g., Basu, Fernald, 
and Kimball, manufacturing industry consists of many firms and the 
technology series for each industry will be affected by within-industry 
firm dynamics. Recently, Amil T. Petrin, Kirk White, and Jerome P. 
Reiter analyzed firm dynamics in U.S. manufacturing for the 1977–
1996 period.59 They show how aggregate technological change can be 
decomposed into contributions from firm technological change in the 
form of pushing out the production frontier and reallocation of 
resources between firms with different productivity levels. They find 
that the reallocation effects are negative during recessions in their 
sample period, while they are positive in other years. By comparison, 
technological change shows a more varied pattern that is also most 
often positive. Still, the findings suggest that changes in market shares 
of firms with different productivity levels may depress industry or 
manufacturing technology even in periods when underlying firm 
technology is improving. 
 Evidence for the interwar period on distinguishing firm dynamics and 
technological change is more scattered. There are many documented 
examples of disembodied technological change through the improvement 
of plants.60 Although these developments varied considerably across 
industries, they also continued during the Depression. It is more 
challenging to establish the role of firm dynamics, the productivity  
 
59 Petrin, White, and Reiter, “Impact.” 
60 Fano, “Technical Progress,” pp. 257–59; Field, “Technological,” p. 229; and Bernstein, 
“Response.” 
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levels of firms, and how their size varied throughout this period.61 
Timothy Bresnahan and Daniel Raff perform such an analysis for the 
motor vehicle industry, using the Biennial Census of Manufactures data 
between 1929 and 1935.62 They establish that there are two forces at 
work. First, firms remaining in business experienced large declines in 
output and relatively smaller declines in employment. This led to a 
decline in measured labor productivity and the difference in the rates of 
decline suggest labor hoarding. The second force is the entry of more 
productive new firms and the exit of less productive old firms. A third 
force that might have operated but was not important in the motor vehicle 
industry was shifts in market share between firms that remained in 
business. The net result of these forces in the motor vehicle industry was 
an increase in output per man-hour. We do not know the effects  
on industry technological change due to missing capital data in the 
Bresnahan and Raff study. However, this net result may well have  
come out differently in other industries. Indeed, widespread bank failures 
during the Depression may have cut off credit to low and high 
productivity firms alike, distorting the market mechanism that would 
normally have favored highly productive firms.63 This remains a 




 The driving force behind recessions remains a topic of great interest 
and for the Great Contraction in the United States in particular. In this 
article, we have aimed to determine whether technology shocks are 
likely to have played an important role during this episode. Following a 
strict version of real business cycle (RBC) theory, the answer would  
be that technology shocks are the only driving force. This strict version 
is not a commonly held view, but a number of authors claim that 
technology shocks played a major role. Our findings suggest that this 
was not the case. 
 We construct an industry productivity data set covering all of 
manufacturing across 19 branches for the period 1919–1939. This 
data set includes all the variables that are commonly used for 
productivity analysis: output, intermediate inputs, capital (horsepower 
installed), and labor (wage earners and salary earners). To establish the 
role of technology shocks, we estimate industry production functions and 
find robust evidence of increasing returns to scale. We use the residuals 
 
61 Margo, “Employment,” pp. 50–51. 
62 Bresnahan and Raff, “Intra-Industry,” pp. 320–26. 
63 Rosenbloom and Sundstrom, “Sources,” p. 736. 
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from these production functions, our measure of “purified” technology 
change, to test a central prediction of RBC theory, namely whether 
technological change is positively correlated with input use such as total 
hours worked. The methodology follows that of Basu, Fernald, and 
Kimball for the postwar U.S. period. We find very similar results for the 
interwar period. Over a two-year time horizon, technology change has no 
statistically significant positive relationship with inputs. This finding is 
robust to a wide range of alternative specifications of the production 
function. These findings suggest that even the weaker version of RBC 
theory, namely that technology shocks played a role alongside other 
supply-side shocks, such as distortionary taxes or government supply side 
policies, is not supported.64 
 There is little role for technology shocks in driving the Depression 
because the results show increasing returns to scale in manufacturing 
industries. As a result, Solow residual TFP change is mismeasured since 
that measure assumes constant returns to scale. Returns to scale might 
have been increasing because manufacturing firms had market power  
or because they hoarded labor and capital during downturns. We find 
clear evidence in favor of labor and capital hoarding and no evidence 
pointing to market power. We therefore conclude that the hoarding of 
production factors was the dominant reason for the decline in measured 
Solow residual TFP in U.S. manufacturing between 1929 and 1933. 
That still leaves important issues for future research: in particular the 
Depression’s effect on firm-level dynamics in entry, exit, and changes 
in market shares and the relationship between dynamic changes and the 
adoption of new technologies. 
 
Appendix 1: Data Sources and Methods 
 
 This appendix describes the methods used to construct the data set. We explain in 
more detail how we arrived at the hourly wage rates used to calculate the total number 
of hours worked for each branch. Additionally, the census data on capital—or to  
be more precise—on horsepower of installed machinery does not cover all years for  
the period under investigation. Therefore, we also explain the methods applied to 
calculate biennial capital data. Appendix Table 1 shows the 19 separate branches of 
manufacturing distinguished in this article. Together, they cover total manufacturing. 
The complete data set can be found in the online appendix.  
 
 
64 Bernanke and Parkinson, “Procyclical,” pp. 449–51; Cole and Ohanian, “Second Look,” 
pp. 46–47; Francis and Ramey, “Source,” pp. 6, 18; and Ohanian, “Great Depression,” p. 2333. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1 






Animal products 0 0 0 
Vegetable products except beverages 0 0 0 
Beverages and ice, total 0 1 0 
Textiles and their products 1 0 0 
Forest products 1 1 1 
Paper and allied products 1 1 0 
Printing, publishing, and allied industries 0 0 0 
Chemicals and allied products 0 1 0 
Products of petroleum and coal 1 1 0 
Rubber products 1 1 0 
Leather and its manufactures, total 1 0 0 
Finished products of leather, total 0 0 0 
Stone, clay, and glass products 1 1 1 
Iron and steel and their products 1 1 1 
Nonferrous metals and their products 1 1 1 
Machinery, not including transportation equipment 0 0 1 
Transportation equipment, air, land, and water 1 0 1 
Tobacco manufactures 0 0 0 
Miscellaneous industries 0 0 1 
Notes: “Bernanke/Parkinson” indicates whether (part of) this industry was covered in the sample 
of Bernanke and Parkinson, “Procyclical”; “Capital-Intensive” indicates whether an industry is on 
average in the top half of the capital-output distribution; and “Durable” indicates whether the BEA 
currently classifies this industry as part of durable manufacturing in its GDP by Industry accounts. 
 
Wages and Hours Worked 
 
 The wage data in the article come from three sources. For the period 1933!1939  
data from the U.S. Department of Labor, Monthly Labor Review (MLR) were used for 
some 100 selected industries. From this monthly data, annual averages were 
calculated for each industry. The industries were matched with census industries and 
the numbers of wage earners working in these industries were added. Using employment 
as weights, the approximately 100 industries were then classified into the 19 branches 
presented here.  
 The MLR did not collect hourly wage rates prior to 1933. However, index numbers 
are available for the entire period. Woytinsky and Associates present index numbers on 
hourly earnings from 1919 to 1939 for 38 industries based on data from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics.65 Again, we matched these industries with census industries and 
summed over the total number of employees available from the census. Employment in 
these industries covers close to 50 percent of the entire manufacturing sector.  
The index series of the individual industries were aggregated to the branch level,  
using the census’s employment of wage earners as weights. For the Machinery  
branch, Woytinsky and Associates present index numbers on agricultural implements  
and machinery only, which constitute between 3 and 5 percent of the total branch. 
Therefore, other sources have been employed to increase coverage in this branch. 
 
65 W. Woytinsky and Associates, Employment and Wages in the United States, table 20, pp. 
588!95. 






APPENDIX FIGURE 1 
 WEEKLY WORKING HOURS IN TOTAL U.S. MANUFACTURING, 1919–1939  
(1929 = 100) 
 
Source: Jones, “New Estimates.” For the sources used in this study and an explanation, see the 
text. For the year 1929 Jones’s data report an average number of hours per person per week of 
48 hours, while the value derived in this study was calculated to be 45.7 hours. 
 
 The National Industrial Conference Board (NICB) collected hourly wages for a 
selection of industries as well. Following the same procedure as with the other two 
data sources, these industries were matched to census industries and their hourly 
wages aggregated to branch level using industry wage earner employment as weights. 
The NICB data were used to provide additional coverage for the Machinery branch.  
 To arrive at hourly earnings for each of the 19 branches, we employed a 
combination of the sources described above. For the years 1933!1939 the data from 
the Monthly Labor Review were used. To calculate hourly wages for 1919 to 1931, 
the growth of the indices found in Woytinsky and Associates was used together with 
the levels of 1933 for each branch. For the Machinery branch, the level data of the 
NICB were taken for the period between 1921 and 1929, due to its superior coverage 
of industries in the Machinery branch. To calculate the wages in Machinery for 1929 
and 1931 the growth of the index for Transportation Equipment was used. Average 
hourly wages for total manufacturing were calculated from the individual branches, 
using the total number of wage earners from the census in each branch as weights to 
ensure consistency. The MLR does not provide hourly wages for any industries in the 
Miscellaneous Industries branch, nor do any of the other sources used. Therefore, the 
weighted average hourly wage rate of total manufacturing was used as a proxy for the 
wage rate in this branch. 
 From the data on total wages paid in the census and the hourly wages at the branch 
level, total hours worked in each branch can be calculated. In Appendix Figure 1, we 
compare our results for the total manufacturing sector with the estimates of Ethel 
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Jones to provide a reference.66 Jones produced estimates of the average number of 
hours worked per week for wage earners in manufacturing, corrected for time spent on 
holidays and sick leave. The resulting values on hours worked reflect the time spent by 
workers on the job, not the time paid for by employers. The data on hours worked in 
the present study are calculated by dividing the total wages paid by an hourly wage 
rate for each industry. Therefore, these data must be interpreted as hours paid for, not 
hours spent on the job, since no adjustments for holidays and sick leave were made  
as was done in the study of Jones. In order to compare our series with Jones’s, we 
divided our data on total hours worked at the total manufacturing level by the total 
number of wage earners and subsequently divided this number by 52 to arrive at the 
average number of hours paid for per person per week. The two data series on average 
weekly hours were converted to an index, with reference year 1929, to provide a 
comparison of the growth trend over time. Appendix Figure 1 shows that the growth 
rate of the numbers calculated in this article follow the trend of Jones’s data quite 
closely at the total manufacturing level. It needs to be noted that we only used 
logarithmic growth rates in the regression estimates. Note, that both series display a 
sharp drop in hours of 25 percent between 1929 and 1935.67  
 Additionally, data on the number of salaried workers and salaries paid were 
gathered from the census data. As no hourly wage rates were available for salaried 
workers, we have put the average number of hours worked by a salaried worker equal 




 We constructed an annual capital stock series at the disaggregated level using the 
investment series by Dewhurst et al. and a perpetual inventory method to estimate 
stocks.68 We found that annual depreciation rates averaging 45 percent were needed to 
arrive at the benchmark capital stock estimates by Creamer, Dobrovolsky, and 
Borenstein.69 This suggests that the benchmark capital estimates and the investment 
series are inconsistent. As an alternative method, we used perpetual inventory method 
estimates from the 1919 benchmark with an arbitrarily established depreciation rate of 
15 percent. However, as was noted in the article and shown in the online Appendix, 
the overall conclusions are not sensitive to the capital stock estimates. 
 Census horsepower (HP) statistics were available for 1919, 1923, 1925, 1927, 1929, 
and 1939. Therefore, data for the other census years had to be estimated. We did not 
simply interpolate linearly but tried to take cyclical variations into account. This was 
done in the following way: Value Added (VA) minus Total Wages paid (TW) was 
calculated and deflated with the deflator of the Machinery branch. The result (VA!TW) 
was taken as a proxy for gross investment. To calculate the level of horsepower for an 
industry for a particular year, the difference in the level of horsepower of the 
surrounding years was measured. We added to this value a depreciation of horsepower, 
which was calculated by multiplying horsepower in the year prior to the year(s) lacking 
data by a flat biennial depreciation rate (/) of 10 percent times the number of missing 
observations in between. Sensitivity analysis using alternative depreciation rates did not 
 
66 Jones, “New Estimates.” 
67 The sharp fall in average weekly working hours in American manufacturing differs from 
the general pattern in Europe; in the United Kingdom, the working week stayed well above 45 
hours during the Depression. See De Jong and Woltjer, “Depression.”  
68 Dewhurst et al., America’s Needs. 
69 Creamer, Dobrovolsky, and Borenstein, Capital in Manufacturing.G
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change the results. This gives a measure of change in horsepower between the years 
surrounding the missing data. Then we added the (VA!TW) values of all intervening 
years plus the end year for which data are available. Dividing the change in horsepower 
by this number gives the amount of horsepower per unit of (VA!TW) for each branch, 
which will be referred to as (R). This number is used to calculate the value of 
horsepower in the intervening years. Calculating forward from the year prior to the 
missing data, horsepower for each intervening year can be calculated by  
 
HPt # 1&/- .HPt&1 $ R VA &TW- .t                       (1) 
 






HPt$1 & R VA &TW- .t01 23                    (2) 
 
Using both methods produced two estimates for each year. As the last (first) year for 
which data is available can also be estimated in this way, we were able to see whether 
this estimation led to a bias. Typically, calculating forward yields a downward bias in 
the last year and calculating backward yields an upward bias for the first year. To 
offset these, a weighted average was calculated, with weights decreasing with the 
number of years from the starting year from which is calculated.  
 These results are dependent on the depreciation rate that is chosen. In this case we 
based it on an average asset lifetime of 20 years. However, experimenting with other 
depreciation rates showed that increasing the depreciation rate works to reduce the 
growth in horsepower installed in the early years of the depression and increases it in 
the second part of the 1930s for branches experiencing slow to moderate growth in 
terms of horsepower installed. For fast growing branches with respect to horsepower 
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